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the I itlon/ , a new
strategic doctrine wat ^ssed In the tee In
thf ly^O's by the New frontiersmen. As a direct rey
unique *nd different requirements of national sec,
policy were conce 1. ictured wit . . for-'
pollr/. These requirements, both mints -"111*
as they were conceived - ' 1 thr
administration are the subject of this thesis.
h% study begins with brief o e
strategy of th° National ;>curlt. - of the New ters-
men. yonlc st r ae - I urh^d pon, c .en
there Is a brief discussion of some of the probable essr
tlals of the stmt i 1 1ns reived.
he next area of research presp'-' e
Kennedy concej tlon of requirements, military
respectively, In th* t of ooi ' te essays. Lra-
ments ere listed I In tr apters a net
core :>r or "lmatrp" of such requirement «? asseverated
durir 'repclrrlnl , it the •
I i dee"1 he lvplem'
of thesi s. In a - 1 ord'
'78
•
2more sp requl renonts,
ters Illustrate: how the. remente) acted us nildeooeta
for decisions end mejo^ protramc, how ' »nced f
policy, pM hoi paesr ».
nee, by analysis of these three areas - strategy,
requirements i Implements tlon of the renulrements - this
study tries to establish the essence ol the Kennedy concept
of natlonnl securi* >llc
That requirements of were deter tegy
was a fundamental premise of the Kennedy a
thesis of this researcn Is thrt the new forward strategy
conceived and lmplemen* he Kennedy ad^lnl i de-
termined In turn requirements which were unique to . .
policy In some resr:ec' , table to fh° prorullln j 1-
tlons 01" the national syr*- . (.nher<- he n? I of
John . teimedj and his New Fr Ten.
I aid In comprehend lr the cone




>£ of ' 1 that I llre-
ntrits, or all' '-raontR, are determined ie nat




o forces, ^s to
resoui .- , ' t further lr
premise is th titj as military strategy.
In th rated from the total
nati , tech
tool factors as well as the
illtar?
admlnlst Ises become o
po a. In 1 ! key to a major shift In
requl -amenta of the Hew Front] he
, isenho. er a-' to f
new ^lx o In lieu of the
massive ret: 1.1*






uter substant* ence -is at -y
shl /ided •. Kennedy's strate?
Ideas 1 efly hen posnlble concrete
questions nhl !y strategists hsve raised In
devel the strategy are presented.
EA ATBGY
h ledy istratlon doctrln* (hereafter referred
as the doctrine of flc esponse) may be observed In
severe 1 contexts prior to its manifestation In the first
hundred days of the adr lnlstraM ->n. Four of these sources
will be examined: Profes ?f
fll'-t ; r o r • s h^ 'Irnv r » --.,,
Job' . ' yy o oat an Lxon- ^nnedy
debates.
ohelllng of Harvard is one o :>re
articulf Lata who spoke out li last
years of the hower admlnlstr . Others In
Kenry Kissinger, Herman Kahn, Hobert '<•:. osr.ood, Charles J,
• lstett *m
theory of strategy 1 base upon which to oul
.
the flexible ri . e doctrln In \
rat loft] o
may be Inferred as the theses betwe es of





Common as well as ^ereats ere txtnrt
omon.^ th<? participants »1 syste* of ne*
states^. Iisrs is a ralatlonahlp of mutual dapandanea as
wall as oppoi tveen enemies! t, In
whi Intereats of two * lata are completely opposed,
la a apeclal case; it woul I arise in a war of complete axte»
lnatioi , o .ise not even in war. i or :.his reason, • wi
nin ' in a oonfllct ioes not have a strictly competitive Bear
-
in r ; it Is not wl : ve to one's adverc I means
ilng relative to one's ov syster.''^
(2) ie means of is bargainln , r
coraraodatlon and avoidance of mutually dasia 1
if 'here is any posslblll
war, of con ucti *» In a way that minimizes damage, or
of oo adversary ^y threatening war rather than wajrl
it, i IjIII accommodation la as lnport'.nt
as the element of conflict. "3 ouch strata , , takes
the view that most conflict situations are ec ly bar-
I Ln si iona, 3 1 de aot




(3) It la a a ncern »1 force:
I 3 strategy In the sense 1
uslnl e-t^' ned wl he
ef
the exploi n of .It
1 <*mles «t
dislike each other 1 s who
ith esch other.
^
A strategy of conflict emphasises the necessl
of Llty, "C nt H
,
of the rot OS as w*>




last 1 wlt> in' 1 , red.
Moned above - unpure confl'
as lBI , SSJ]
of cr< OS - nro M Lilt m to the c al
of f le reap- tlons




lilts tentative ntler; It was he who
ste on new posl , I ry
ad I s. It was he








• prolo " tru8 .
.
'•». 1 1 thi t l
trine of nr 1 ; a "great f
of fl |] ' nse must i L«ce 1
that it Ion
as a I In strat ooncept has reached
a ,<ent
need for a reappraise 1 of ou- strat»?lc
could offer leaders only two choices,
the lnltlatl . -enerel nuclear wsr or
omlse and retreat... It has not mal -
i that k , »^ce
from dlsturb«noes which are little only
In oq J wit:- l i leral
war.°
aoaanti thp for a "caoabill*--/ to »^t
act of poaal 1
war ' nitrations and
7
aggre h as threaten Laos *» .
new strater.y would r lze that 11 as necessary to
deter or win I cly a limited war as to detr 1 war.
Is this no lement«?tlon of Schelline's strpt
r (New ' la rpet

8• alan
workings of ite as the Ne d. e da-
bate on 8
1
yIyI rsred by tha
L:
In Lasua vhleh forms the backdrop
f I debates on st rater-:.,
betw- strategy of Passive epilation
an t which I have
mer was
adopted es
and hps been ff I ted In the
defense budgets we
I P.on?lr'
port \ I . . . . hui fl ,
denounce Pli sa




Joint | -»fs of .c teff
conflict^ v;l
tfa . larllnln
A chapter on "r Nev. pets
forth tho a fol he
New PronMer In restructu -in natlo
^pter suggests many o L at'onsl ch
fense Bctabllah , not tha least of >1
philosophy for the servlc hllo r was, se,




9ie notes from "the rival trumpet!" were pl«ylng
louri ly < 0« lenatoi John P # Kennedy's spec- the
floor of the I enate, 1^ June 19^0, ***• one very strong com-
position:
lc to our itrength, and
the str he free world - to prove
to the ta that time an-' the
history are not c side, that the
balance of wo I ;>ower Is not s>
way - and that therefore peac "Bent
Is •ssenM'? 1 ml r al.9
• SonPtoi vrer.t Q | say that our tas* Is to devl**
tlonal strata , jased ' -
ated crises", out ori p - f »-
term policies des5 to Increase the str ?e
this speer iator listed twel e ^olnt* vlthin
his new ay h to fo polio . heat
the prelude to the requireaenti of < si °tegy
(ani for this reason they are quot*
Apper I nolude:
(1) -nake I nern^l° c-
power second one."
(2) must r i° ah
tlvely and sv.lftlv 1n any limited wrt anyw^
>• •Mobility r-nd Ters&tlllt./ er
,
_
t I eaoe (New
York: Harp , e,

10
Tuat Into a and conr
dated lilt ry force, le of* deter nttac
r led In weaponry end res. .
(U) e roust, lr l3*r>oratlon wltl 3%
and Japan, greatly lncreaae the flow of ce '.idle
3t and Latin America.... he ne nt will h ; ve to de-
vise an entirely revamped foreign el r - -
which Iflll make t) - co^-ritnents ear to suc-
cessful plan . . . . rt
(5) • must reconstr
Aaerl ocracles.... Lll l atti-
tudes and emphases to mak In Arc




which or p: spends.








thf ' . . rtrr'





, " "U.o. sup- , " •deteminf
L08S r:*t
terlo 01 . . . stren t .
.e question 1st are we mc In the
direction of peace or security? Is our
relative strength growll ,
Nixon says, our prestige Pt an all-time
, as he week a, d, and thi r of
the ( -lets at an all-time low? 1
doi ' t i >] i( • e It Is. I con't believe c
relstive stren tl Ls increase
priority .
tat poln^ of ell this Is, this ls a
str <=> in which we're engage
want peace. . We want
«r ... re to demonstrate
to the people of the world that we're
o> r ned In this free c ours
lrst - not first If, &nd not first
bu*" , nd not first when - but first. I 2
Loss of presr \ e .
I the si. nX icance of p*~esti< e really,
ls because we're so identified with the
ise of frc . Therefore, if we're
on the • , if we're up If ou
flu \ spread In
, if our prestige ls
^readln , then those who .r ' now on
the raze e of decision betwe or
between the Communist system, wonderl-
whether they should use f I
freedoa to develop the! ne
system of • , aded
to follow our er r
11
Ld. . . 15. 12
_
•
1 3lbid. , p. k
.
12
The overs l 1 ^pllcptlon of these atateaenta Is that
the Flaenhower admlnlat n was li late I
to net \ , th ot r Lze the em ea
of the tl'nee. Hov rt thajaja ll ta we ~al
accounts for I onn i 'erst- I rer'
stnte o tlon. r t t he sam revall-
wlthln the Binda o r tha seems to ba olaarly
delineated In "he Trent Debataa . Kennedy f nat tha
Ion needed bo be awakened to the ea of
the tlaaa o r th^ tates v and
with relation to these chon^es.
II. Ti: ,ENTIALS 01 JNAL
. OLICY I
a above, a m^ otor In this
study : aridant -- than was a decided shift In na-
tional strata?'/ durln • the ad-nln 1 • i . f than el' -
; ate a tot.pl at this ' , 1 *" l* *
to no^-e lleas which me- in ware vary
v to dp 'R88
the t In well aa
the shift, should apper
Such Ideas ml ht t igi
( I ntever the st









dent to depl with the •nen-y on a tophi ted, ret baric,
. . ,
the President > ->e able o*ne of
{U) strat , It raust be natad at
all levels (commend h ').
( 5) tever the , I I
doubt ther -e up: the
au' of the -. above essentlpls
play pel -art In til level fie:
response
esi ived -







complex are Idered. e are
d as b totPl packet© of requirements ov< iree-
yesr ipfl y ad:
tlon betve of tl Lod.
I. 1
The new strategy had three
er the strictly illtarjr re
of i [Z) aelectivl. (3) co- <-e of
forf cl , In turn, demanded t
qulrei
eterrent
At the hi hert \ev»l of ren^ons»p e stratvlc
nuc t. 1 Kenned" /w cN«mn
•
not envision relaxation of preparation for nuclear w e:
on the contrary, th<* ? Ll-
oatlon of potentln 1 ce," nnd for "ft nuclea'
power second to none."
1 or a llstln of the llltATy r* »li - ' s of a de-




was In a way » , ypandad
doctrln-? or rna«8l'" n. ^ e*
was raqulrad to <ieter nucl d.
hi
der a st he
aa An • entl
»-
oil \ ' " . • .





the office of the Hasli I ler),
has decl I ieflned the r
of the spoctr , ,
fectl I ->n of de
secure e
ataaai b ©re hard er
and concer ' ' , that fl out
«nd bo hal< In re "la
Is on^ reflr
2Johr . > te of
Lda . John . ordnr . . , ew

t In 1 /ears has emphasized * lnutenan
and Pol I
lectlvlty
A more distinctly e In strategy was the conce
tlon of an all-encompasEln,, strar -.-hlch left the President
with choices of "neither Koloceu3t nor hu.r.i Hj. tlon. "
-:e
emphasis moved ed forces In lieu el counter-
force, l rel "i ,le response" r^
irements were sket< Generr"! or In his speech to
the New Yor Inter's Association on 1
outlined our det^r equlrei
(a) j2 (*lth*»r a first strlV-
nuclear att massive conventional Russian thru; t In
•ope) lc deterred by Invulnerable e strike deterrent
forces cor lor retail e.
(b) : l *: ed war (orea) Is deterr^ equate avall-
abl with both m lonal
weapons.
(c) -rs of 1 '. 1 1 on " (' lctnam am ») are I
t«»rr*»d by proper pre a the ief 01
| CM IP" y ( If: 1 t 1 or n •
-01
17
and, If 1, are fou •!
and unconventional .
"
'-economic challenge lr y la-
Inattv* and "Rood , such as the Peace Corps, civic
ac* B }ect
Apollo.
Three days aft speech - apparently
rati; I strategy In la expanded Ratio 9i Coun-
cil gathered at the vhite 9.
' \ - was devel I he
Kennedy adrrlnls: in. The necess
.
f a wide s~
re ve was r e
Bay or the 1 1 * • s
first ye' • La eve
address American Society of Newspp I wa«
a sol , ' cal * ' *»•- of the
nature of our s1 fenalvt.
message was oleer — new t , and new
develo, ec to deal with the ene
raatar tasv faces
ir challenge As ^ore
deserving of our effort and ener




have we fixer eyes *1
illtary needs, on armies | ••
border. LI '* • for f 1 i
It should be clear that this is no lon-er
er , • nat our secu- : re/ be lost rlece
by piece, country by cou- ne
I
of a sin* le bor
is general requlremer;t of sel^ctlvl-
euccl ecretary ; oNamara in a symposium on the ". lve
of V. . icy" on
,
thc-n, we are strengthening our
; to tier
derl fl ' a wide rat
both political . w* are wc
im with our allies to dev^' " i :
I
lefenee polloy, as in our cy
reside expressed lr' a
i-
tion. 6
Leotivit flexibility survived the test ol tirre.
will re seen iapter IV they were a majc rt of the mes-
sage which th"» Pre t conveyed in his e a sage to
Congress for Lsoal fa*
Mary of these key I ttts were to be f In the
\ senhower administration; however, there is little question









that the y r-rw*'* stress c "5-
ment of balanced i on fl*
Seoretary nrs has ev *-het I
a daacrlpt-.lon ware to he mr r* «* of • > gaLj
was "^ fl 'r
forces.
Pe t-h» 14at of i r.







substitute for idequa onal forces
su r foroes.
one o pl^m^
we cannot successfully ventlonal
wars e^ ar
strer.
Control!j e of fo






'is, , a danger
the envlro- wnr. te
destrnctio
thoven, op . c 1 r . , . 31 3»
.W»fl
make* sense to choose to abandon control." *n when It
comes to thermonuclear weapons, If our weapons are to be
used to us alive «nd free, th«lr use must be controlle .
Is concept meant emphasis on the requirement of com-
mand and control facilities. It also meant a reevaluatlon
and replannln, In Western alliance strategy. Specifically,
the Kennedy/McNamara emphasis on controlled deterrents
graduated deterrence h«d several Implications for f
strategists:
(a) U.S. hostility toward national nuclear forces.
is position was made clear by Secretary McNamara In his
famous Ann Arbor speech of 1^ June i'
e general strategy T have simmer 1 zed
magnifies the Importance of unity of
plannlr
, sonaantratioa of executive
authority, and c ^ direction. There
must not be competing and confllctl
strategies. .. .We are convinced that a
Tear war target system Is
Indivisible. If, despite all our efforts,
nuclear war should occur, our best hope
lies In conducting a centrally controlled
campaign against all of the enemy's vital
nuclear capabilities, while retalnln re-





^The full text la found lr. Appendix D.
10 amar
, Saerat ry of Defense, -narks




(b) Tactical nuclear weapons. cNamara continued,
and continues, to stress that tactical nuclear weapons run
the risk of escalation and are no substitute for conventional
forces. 11
(c) Conventional defense. The Kennedy strategy de-
termined greater conventional force requirements In Europe.
The shleld/sword strategy was Ly pass*1 . ' r, , Dvesj-
ber 1 ' ° the strategic landscape In Europe had ohar
Namara could say: "The ground forces of K£TO nations tot
3.2 million, of which 2.2 million men are 1 - ^pe, as
against the soviet ground combat forces total of about 2
million men, and a Warsaw Pact total of 3 million ... In
Central Europe, NATO has more Ben, r! more coabat trooos,
on the t'ro'ind, than does the 31oc." xc
In this same speech of l.'overaber 19^3 1 after hevl
shown the strength of the NATO ground forces, ! cNamara ex-
hibited the chore cteri- lly ambiguous, and subtle nature
of his strate one of this is to say that strength
on the ground In i'Xirope If adequate to turn back without
11
on? an all-out lee r J
11
SI r . \ssln^r, ' f s Nur *,"
American Defense Folic , Associates \ lence
(ed.^, . ~j( i .
12 ?obert S. McNamara, Sec -narks






heae three themea, deterrence-aelectlvlty-control,
are baelc to the Kennedy strategic conceptual framework for
national aecurlty oollcy. They are regulromenta ae well aa
determinants of military requlrementa. They are manifested
In the budget amendments of Fiscal Year ( 2 «nd the decisions
of the first hundred days of the New Frontier (and In the re-
mainder of the administration) as will be seen momentarily.
il. COMPLEMENTARY MILITARY POSTULATES
Complementary to these themea are the postulatea or
aaeumptlons which are beddln^ for t v. trine of flexl
response. Is beddl^ Implicit In the doctrine, but
rarely stated aa actual reoulrements. One 1 v t label these
postulates "conceptual complementary requirements" of the
forcea-ln-beln ' of our national security pollf t»y are:
limited military objectlvea, wlll/credlblll , superiority,
and Interdependence of the Western culture.
Limited military oojectlves
This concept Is best understood In connection with
the nonmlllt.' ry requirement of primacy of the roll' leal.
It to aay that conditions of the International aya-
tem hare greatly altered the concept of total warfare.
Presidential latlon^l will/c r







the beplnr^ ne abeol'i*~ nadaftll , forceful and
determined will In the stmteay of cor it enemy Bust
without a doubt recognize that the U.S. Is firm In her policy.
The President's memorable Inaugural Addresr force-
ly established this concept as a requirement of our se-
curity oollc et every nation know that we shall pay any
price, oeir any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend,
oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of 1
erty. mlk
Th he equation of power equals strength times will
(P«S'v') was recognized? the Intimate relationship of capability
and Intention was reco nlzed. The enemy must have no question
as to our Intents and Durrores. lscus« > al security
and peaceful coexistence In February 19^? » M r. Theodore C.
Achilles, Sooclal Assistant to th*» Under Secretary for Polit-
ical Affairs, expressed this strong conviction of Mm New
ontler:
it one decisive point must be made.
wlet concern over the oonsequenoes
of a nuclear war Is, and will contln
to be, dlreotly proportional to our
•^John F. Kenned/, "Inn 1 Address," Janua
urn the Tide . . 7,
.
24
capability and o I produce
the consequences that they fear. *3
r. Achilles went on to say that any relaxation — "any
demonstration of uncertainty of will on our part" — and
the Soviets could come to a different estimation of the
likely outcome of one or another gamble.
A basic conceptual raqulru national security
In the New Frontier and one which Is related directly to the
Idea of will Is that the enemy *>e convinced that we will use
our spectrum of capabilities. Say the New Frontiers^*
he Important thlnK Is not to convince an aggressor that we
will ur^e nuclear weapons. The Important thln> is to convince
him that we will use whatever force that Is necessary to pre-
serve our freedom . . . the most credible kind of threat Is
the threat that we will do what In the event will be most In
interest to do. In the case of piecemeal nonnuclear
aggression, that will be to apply conventional forces."
lblllty, then, Is a fundamental requirement.
wit' ' l ^cc
without strength can acoompllsh 11 r ; . In read; ersor
accounts of President Kennedy's anpro ) for*-! •,
^Theodore C. c .111*8, "Peacef oexlstenco nn . .
• lonal Security," of t











one senses that he was deeply concerned wit be need to be
determined and willful, and to oomnunloa t* this determlnat
the enemy. ' ey t a White House correspondent for
ne durlnr the first two years of the New Prontier, writes
of a private Kennedy comment: "The Jtate Department is a
. . . | • 3 | ot all those people over there who
are constantly silling. I thln^ we need to smile less and be
inedy decision to shift Chester 3owles fro*
Under Secretary to Sj epresentative ai to the
Pre be rationalized in ]
In the first several months of offlc- , eoldent
nnedy ar nd again stressed the need for tion to
nov forward in a determined, certain course of His
Ina , ate of * ' , and Special Messages to Cong-
ress all have the flavor of this concept. fe seemed to be
attempting to euide thf -m into 3 - ] framework for
• doctrine of fit o. The psyche il br
was att illustrated
I Iderlru', the loin vel of the spectrum of re-





As one iry wi in.
Navy, antly ask*'* 1, "Ars Vt M fog*
1 8Limited War? ' As the doctrine of flexible res:
In the Tlnrts of the nd pollcy-^v^r^ fr~~ 1955 " ,
was the I srolvini oorrespondlr 3
attitude was -ssldent Kennedy was
I was 1 awaken ' blon to a proper per-
spect is 6n »g.
Thus, he ohr for the New ' • L er was to hip
the nubile aware n r he equation R- uals
capabll 1 •' tlaes wllll^ In oth^r w New 7
tier, havln- de f -> | t 9 be a n^nt
of np' , set lean public
of this renulren n t. One excellent examr
|
f an attempt to
awaken the nubile* s eyss was the President's dec he
Berlin raaall In th* summer of ey wrltesi
In his private moments the Presl
worried about the state of preparedness
of the country. Were the peo eady
for a showdown? . . • And
,
stories In the magazine? md news
conferences were not
to be some sense of participation . 1^
(ovm underll
Wa< • •• (T-\
Instlfu' -din, .






qulrennnt of ar superlc h tactical and stra-
teplc) I 'itilrtr tlon has merely adopted
a postulPto It in our sec ram since post-
war Two. Fhs t i nedy's
agenda" of June 19*0 assumed this concept: lrst - we nu.
make lnvvlne? a nuclear retaliatory power s^
on o
!
tlcal nuclear weapor , ^cr^t ^Nanar* assuaed
He stated i Lc r c">n« i that the . . is presently
substr 'ly superior In de i , iversi d nmnhers
t his < ' of v ^. eiar acle
superio if , "-a we cfn res erst^nd If we cor. :>w
our p us of str altered If the
tables v:ere reversed am It. >ei' Let I I held
a comraandl id In •*
Pr 1
i wea">
only when . we be cer-










edy strategy was *
o.essl* « ftm 1 waa r.ot a
new v »n, yet tlv
t lonshir" waa in
•
•m the Unl1 -is wo . :>t be a
per^ onshlt). The U. A] stemming from theae
facts wes to be a partnership.
>pt was fully devel
ned ' oss i ladelphla,
T will 84 now
once that the United
•
Ion of interdependence," thHt we
lib' ...
with a Unite' le way and
Ian tic partnership » a mutually ber.
f\ partr ew
union now emer I ^ope ie
old Amer 4 n founded here 175
years ago. 22
As we knov., the President ' e Id not come
Into beln^ In In years. resident Kennedy had
eenseri the 3 lens Inherent In a partners 1 . In
2?
. ,





hi: ^ech h lis w ,t be com-
pleted In • ye , let t<
stow, Chairman of the lepartme S te'e
Council , and a prominent member -a New
-ks the build In o Ian lc partner. M
"th and dellcr' ece latlontl arc 1-
tec ever under 1 it a time of peace. "^ real-
ize, In Tie* 3 ) ilems, const




re-- oont of f' e.
national nur"! lemand-
ln all loatrol •
spectrin of forces mi re a bullc 1 ^ean
convent
1
rer. ' - frlatloi ^ted newes
of the ' onnedy itrategy lr
In 19'' 7 th« Joh; amarr tear is " same
friction.
Ion Is bert We-
rner






the one which Is most divert e of flexl
an article tn In . .
rategles' ano Continental Europe, ate ar?uea
In favor o r n . . Counterforce (In th» senr*- of shoot the
f the
' ear w< ... aril of
eacalat* >st be e . -t
POS81
- of the
ai" b evi Lts , ap-
or a'
that no true Atls -•artners" 1 , no
happen a8 lon^ as the leader aets the
r
y nationalistic dlnoaaurs as
25
Ar as t ' -wnnln . n-
tln s-
seas
rln res "th refers
^d
** is we havr he
^rate-
;lai' and Continental >#," United tates
26Ibid.




ensuln years, DeGaulle helped himself.
In concluding , one could state that there was a def
te general trend extant in the New Frontier conception of
Lltary requirements. This was the trend toward balanced
forces, away from a Utopian counterforce strate
work was laid by the Elsenhower administration; however, It
only gave lip service to the concept of limited war, with
little support throu h budgetary action.
Mr. George E. Lowe, a Foreign Service officer, wrltll
in the Nav&l Institute Proceedings of April 1962, appropri-
ately summarizes this trend:
Of all the actions concerned with national
security that the Kennedy Administration
has taken thus far, three stand out: the
stress on Invulnerable second strike deter-
rent forces; the greater emphasis on
limited war and paremlll f operations, and
the appointment of one of the major forr -
lators of flexible response or balanced
deterrence, General Kaxwell D. Taylor, asr ii u vi<
the Presidents military advisor.*?
2?Ceorge E. Lowe, "Balanced Forces or Counterforce?,"
United States av-<l Institute Proceedings, Volume , Jinber




he less-olearly conceived nonrallltary requirements
are more difficult to analyse and ev ^e. Yet, the New
Frontier, with eloquence of phrase at one of its attribute!
,
conceived certain nonmllltary requirements of national se-
curity policy to be pre-eminent. ese requirements mi^-ht
be listed as U.o. economic strength, oosltlve . . action
and leadership* polit leal Interdependence within the At-
lantic Alliance, executive style or teohniaue, and primacy
of the political.
. U.S. C 'NOMIC STRENGTH
There is little doubt that the New Trontler rec
nlzed the prosperity of the United states to be sn lrre
lble minimum requirement of a national security rollcy.
President Kennedy was convinced that the key to the success-
ful administration was more stability In the national econony.
ther, he knew that strength at hone was vital to stren
abroad.
II. POSITIVE U.S. ACTION AND LKADE
From its befflnnl^
,
from the time "' tssed,
.-on
.too*
Bw •Ml $m m^M
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the New frontier emphasized that the U.S. was to assise a
H role In the Cold War and In the Internet lon*l system In
toto. This requirement oan perhaps best be understood co
ceptually by rms 1 he view of . Charles • '• . In
. . .
.nri After , discusses U«8«
war strategy In terms of two stages. se of the
first stage of our (U.S.) "strategy of response" was basic-
ally that of contalnmei he purpose of the second was "1
08cow to the acceptance of a rational and lnstl*
tlonallzed International r.olltloal system." This second
stfige was not effectively | ^mented Kennedy ad-
ministration, says Dr. Lerche: "It was the fate of the
tragically br ennedy administration to make the first
overt If hesitant moves toward Its lrrpleraente
sponse* In second-sta/.e American strategy would no longer
be a useful basis for action." Once American strategy was
advanced to this s , I • es Dr. Lerche, "tactical lnl-
2tlatlves must be the keystone of Unltr ."
ies this shift Into a second stage In readl
the literature of the New Frontier. The need to act-, to -nove,
Is hl-hly emphasized. In fact too much so, ?nv critics of the
1-Char . Lerche, rhe Col . . .






New frontier. Closely tied In with thl» action policy 1b
rec Ion of the revolutionary change* presently rrlns
within the International eyst< <»cretary Rusk, speak \
In May 1962, states: "The President thus ealls upon us to
resume our leadership In ' of freedom an H to
Join with It our leadership In ' revolution of economic
and social progress ... It Is a task of as
Into one grewt family of man. "3
Earllc Li stated this same
requirement In a different context. He alluded to t\
changes In the world today, statins thrt our forelcn pollr
could be formulated through two different approaches. On the
one hand, we could undertake active defense of the status quo
and be passive In relation to these changes. On 'he other
hand, we "attempt to take a certain leadership In change
Itself; certolnly the world Is not as we should like to s
U
It, and the world Is not as peoples elsewhere find tolerable."
^dless to say, the er appr^ «s adopted by the
nedy ndTlnlstrntlon. The reo i !l r PT">nt of "leader
change" was a strona conviction of Preslder-' . . .
i
, secretary of State, ?«do«
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1^3), "Wemar
Tennessee, 17 1962," p, k7
.
, Secretary of State, * • he
latlon of horel llcy," Dep^rtr^.nt of .tate bullet
. LI k t 20 : arch 1961, p.
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"We seeV-, in , not * static hut a dynamlo peace," de-
clared hie .Secretary of State. 5 "his conception of leader-
ship subtlely underlies the statements of the New lers-
men. The policies of military containment and of negative
"ant 1 -communism" are passe and pone forever.
eodore Achilles boldly states this re iirement: "it
Is not enough merely to be against somethlnp or to reset. We
must act; we must be positive and dynaml must get on
with the Job of helpln- to shape the kind of world we would
want to see If harxlst-Lenlnlsm had never existed. Clearly
then, second stage policy Is to be Implemented. And clearly
the fourth requirement of General Taylor 1 s four-pert sdpc-
trum Is to be activated.
Central to this conception of . . strategy Is the
belief that the . . must play a vl I ^le In relation to
the underdeveloped countries. I must not per1 ' I Image
of a status quo nation, thwarting the forces of chenre, to
prevail throughout these countries. Wa must emphasize our
lief In change, to the point of overstat error/ . Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for ^u lie
writes, status quo has never been our so let It
->: xepn .us
, I rontlars of
nt of -t>-t-r v Uotln , VI V, . 11^7, 19 Juno
^Achilles, or. clt.
, p. \27 .

bo all we ask no ot hrr Deople to worship It. "7
This "leadership In ch \ recent kos basic
the less urgent, but Junt as d us, crises that the Ken-
nedy ad-^lnls* ->n fac*<i In Jpn' L. ... Rostow,
spenklnr I I two Lat«r, sjftTt « terse evaluation of
the doIIcv raqulrei envisioned in order
Mr» C offensive:
(a) We n^ 1», a policy which would al
'
the Unltr*-' tatat aatlvsly »lth the great forces In Latin
trios whloh seek ecor ~eater social
Justice. (Alliance for Progress.)
(b) We needed a for aid program capable of all^n-
the United States with similar forces at work In Asia,
the Middle "il^st, and Africa (AID and new foreign all le^ls-
lon)
.
(c) Ma nai ' o^^nt of new r with
Western °, for tha "facts of life" hi* char ed in West-
ern Err
, ha . . l 'on,"
of State lulletln




. ostow, *Tha Present Stags of the •i







I. NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH WESTERN PARTNERS
La laet required policy loads ln'o another nonmlll-
tary t aa conceived by the New frontier; that la,
a new relationship Kith our V'ratera partners. Juat aa thla
waa a "illltary reoulrement, ao r oo It- waa a requirement from
a poll'lcl and economic atandpol' It la appropriate here
to repeat the President's July Uth 19^2 words, "... we will
be ready for a Declaration of Interdependence."
statements by Undersecretary of State (for
1 'ffalra) George McGhee, In defenae of th resi-
dent's tr^de program, bring forward this requirement. t&aj
trade pr r , 8tateJ lee, provides the keystone '. o our
whole forward national strategy:
lej adoption of the proposed trade legl8-
latlon will pel
cooperate In bulldln* a solid economic
foundation underneath ' v
munlty system, which ^he "grand design"
envl ea as the hsr '• of *"h<» i
curlty and economic well-beln of the
entire i'ree 'o-
?e concluded his d "h? re-
reme^ of unity a ievelop-
irent of a of Interests, \ all the
varied a< s and a 's statelier
*orge o Ilea, b President 1
to the r- w Deal. , nt of Jtate Eullel I,
. 113?, Fub 73^n
, I P. ?•

nlllu-'rntes the requirement of . . relationship with other
ustrlallred countries In the Prt)S re
than the rrilltary sense. We know thnt lr «» is
condition of the times.
. EX tCUTIVS IQUE
A I ?r requlremer I sec policy •
conceive'- 11 • redy i istratlon Is what Is nebulously
termed Piecitlve style. Preslder
'
"llectunl 1 !
executive and en historian In his own
I about this requirement and Its t , all dis-
tinct! 'ated to polloy-aaklB Its machi r. ->ll-
llan Car , lve Assistant Dlrec
"get, After hovln es of -rig
under Kennedy, conclude h a contrast -over
edy admlnlstrntlor "And y >/ere to sua U
the let of the t- [ lone
,
would s" * in the ly approach to polloyaaklnf we
observe an emphasis on te< as o: d an ob3esslon
with Tlth a str ocus










Selected Papers , 87th Con
.-•c
39
Mr. Is an admirr * Kennedy "style."
are others who are more reluctant to prals* ">dy ••
proact . he style appears to their, to be informal and casual.
It ) o elaborate, they say, with lte obsesslo
i *y and emr and it* it
require deol to b ected
more, critics write, there Is no prlorlt he
1 lcy-tiaklng process.
• he vflld ev on, In Iprll 1 1 Pres"
nnedy realized that the national security policy **
needed I IP In light of th*» 9ay of PI
tragedy. He asked General Taylor, J n set ew
York as president of the Lincoln Arts Center for the
lnj Arts, to head an Investigation of the disaster. ~bert
Kennedy, Ac I "Ice and LI llles
T aylor
The n was manifestation of mac/
the ^edy style.
was that won John
den' 1 m, Rr« Sldey >
I
"They questioned every promise. word,
they had to see thi for thtatal ts.
U-Charlet Burton Nai LI, "lit ; >llc on




riveted Papers, 87th Con- i Session, p. 1'.
1c a i i
They wanted facts, k s. »y made the J
when they 'he facte. - Irtr-
tlcs an element of s Lflo rectd •««
tlc-ll.v." 1
"
^re was re r was -
gene lor of the . as expresses
neath It •<* was confident* li the New
5 er, and \n t-h* s.
[CAL
most slgnlflr >f net ty
policy Is the primacy of the political.
nedy administration have very definitely esta Is
requirement. Henr ir t in wrV '"
clearly re
»f^n-«-q of *
Kennedy administration has been to sub-
ject Hit ' • __ r
larly nuclear weapons — to poll' leal
contr 1 >t only befoi -
during military operations as well.
Ion h-^ v ~
rence failed there wae no logical stop-
laoe . 13
lr
' »p« alt. , p. I***.
Am' '?nse tollcy ,
.
1*1
Rr n of this concept is a heart of accept-
ance of the stmtegy of limited war. Robert od'e
wrl I n limited war In the late 5^'» relate the Aaarlcan
position ns It has been and as it should and mur Is
writings are Indeed i Les of the conoept of political pri-
macy as medy administration. - . Osgood
justifies war on the grounds that military power
fl h mal policy, M n e only
lepltl ^pose of Tillltery force 1b to serv* '.he nation's
I lves. 1^
As er stated, the Kennedy admlnlr on made
a vast effort to estabT
I
le of poll over
and above ailitary as a rement of national security
pollc
Kenn^ Is not a novel Idee; rather, It
is on^ ' has ev with the passage of time and the grow-
ing HD of *-he Unl' tates as a superpower. L« of the
military In s had to shift with the ohan lnt- na-
ture of pew mmQ s y st • • alloy
In the 1960*8 1 on a spectrum of fa,
tors, all of whl^h ar*» lr The 11111 rs can-
not and must not pre ^wever, -hey must be properly
weighed or f! nov^r forgotten or downgraded.
l^Uober- . Osgoo , h« Anerl pproach to War,
American i -.;?• 'lie , pp. 98-109.

Advr further, o n state that at the
bate of the of 8tr»-
'
fro* missive retail*!
-ces Is the faet that ' -nr. of
power have chsn e la fact, which has beei deve
oped by Ca . Anne, . , . .
effect, nt. the crux of the . rement ot leal
V
>f polltleal, t« leal and lnter-ia-
tlonal r s on enoaenal, says Captain
Ainrae. War h~ s I ^ss usef.l M an Instrument o: joLlcy:
mill* ower and become even more Inseparable;
a role for power of f he B,8« .... In \
In measures to counter them becomes
prom In
f
llltary power as a technique ol aetlon moves






. . . h
world today are not susceptible to
a Military solution, rj
posture must be sufficiently
!5; Lb C* Si
lnr Natr ower,
ln> . . Nunr ,
lflfl/
be:
flexible and under control to be
consistent with our efforts to ex-
very step to lessen tensions, to
I n p*-' to
secure arms limitations.
f r* Ion ct
ternatlvee, to be used where
er fells: enc e-
rnent the oth
this same message the President mentioned a corollary
requirement of political primacy; to wit: our arms must be
subject to ultimate civilian control and commend at all times.
A study of the str of the Secretary of defense's
po6it relative to that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
the service chiefs, under the Kennedy administration, would
undoubtedly Indicate that this corollary requirement has been
strictly adhered to by the Department of Defense. The le ' -
latlon was present under the Elsenhower administration for a
powerful civilian head in the Department of Defense, parti
ularly after lj5&. However, other than in the very basic
sense of civilian control this legislation was not t y used.
. j above is a short introduction to the complexity of
the polltlcF l/ri>llitary power relationship and to the changes
that have occurred therein since 19^5« here changes are
fundamental to an understanding of the Kennedy con< of
political primacy and lti lementary strategic co s.










porte 1 s of the mee' \
his space I Ly "ft rl Ca^.srln's he
Prcslrion*- f In th** early *ee :t of ths n-
tier with th« day-to-
tlrae to co- r *h*» close of one he
meetlnrr, l feelings abou 1
'.n decide ' s
w or not. If somebody can Just
tel 1 B« ho to Cf ' . ' rid
-- anybody. I don't care If
It' he
n how . . . here's no thin." more
,17
Six weeks late: , ent I
Congress for e sec^'d tlae in four ronths o
His message a sense
It was nd co- ri
I be! leTi b all
and talents necessftr . . . I am as -
~esp I e coi.
ar a firm r-raent to a new
last fo' y years and carry ve-
heew o< ... I be' I we 6 ]
)on.l®
• space decision car. be comprehended li
lal »<
Urgent National load ,' ' I . , pp. 7

*5
of th* nature of power ftl ne
unprecedented str prestige and esently








Implementation of the requirement! is best observed
thi" historical documentation. Therefore, the next three
chapters describe various ways and means by which the con-
cept reraents became reali'
l chapter first discusses the l lrst months of
the ar. , some basic strategic trends during the
year and, finally, the two major crises of , mj of
Pigs and Berlin.
Initial official announcement of new strate
guidelines carae in the President's .tate of the Onion mes-
sage, 29 January, he ^resident stated that "we mu
re-examine and revise our whole arsenal of tools: mlllta
economic and political. m1 Here , he concept of a in-
faceted security policy was apparent.
In the military "arsenal of tools, " new strategy
was most evident. President Kennedy spofce of e new steps
that were "clearly needed now":
ijohi, . ennedy, "state 01 ssa«e
,
uary 29, 19^1," To T . ?U.
•mm
,
(1) )t ac re^ne the al '>pfecl'
to glTe oo' . "58 the mobility needed -el w:
•mall war sltuat
ilftrli
>n to ac i le
pro.^rfir- .2
s the doctrine of flexl ise evolvl*
I.e., Obi11 , abll I I tl ht 111
able c Thr* r «? lat , arnara dls-
cussr defer
crease tl airlift otpf First deliveries of
C-115' s and C-l 's were scheduled for r 'ears
ahead of Drevlon ma for lnt Mon of pure Jets lr
air lift lnv ;arls p^ was to be e^
ated by nine to ten months thr ise of
funds.
Isrl of our defenr m, w) -osl-
dent directed In his Stnte of t-h*» Hi -nassa^e, r ] ' ed In
aaendm-nt of defense budget e«* ^e
os. first request of 28 Verch I
lft in *»- ^hasls 1 stra-
tegic f 'nns whl<~>-> all-
out nuclei •
2Ibld . , . c

(?) to Improve the commend end I ->1 system so
t our rrllltary forces would at all times, even under co
dltlons of an all-out nuclear attac 1 , under th« f'jll con-
trol of rltlts t ai
(3) to Improve r ir cor >1 or no -
nurlr- llltles.
The second r< ' of 26 Kay 19^1 was designed "to
Improve and modernize further the conventional or nonnuclear
capabilities" and to accelerate work In outer space. he
purpose of the third supplemental request of 26 July was
(1) to Increase substantially the strength and readiness
of our conventional or nonnuclear capabilities, (2) to pre-
pare for further mobilization of reserve forces If the need
should h apparent, and (3) to Increase further our stra-
tsgir mi Rlr defense capabilities.
These were all granted by the Congress and enacted
Into law on 17 August I96I. The defense appropriation for
fiscal year 19^2 was six and one-half Ml 1 Ion dollars more
than the year before. A change of strategy was not Inexpen-
sive.
te of the Union message and the I et re-
quests provide definitive Indorsement of the new strategic
^Captain C. me, U.S.N. , "Naval Strategy and the
New Frontier," United states Navnl Institute Froceedln. s
,
Vol. 1 Number ; , ' -roh I ^ ? , -*-2h.
«
»9
pol 1 c, ie as
Taylor 1 " . of th* 'le -r
In thor hap beer re are tafny
at
a "n<
have In ' Li lad ^ th t c -r. 'on
of these ln1 lbles Is lngnesr ->rd
choicer- publio relatl M position of the
Joint Chiefs or I tt\ h e quantitative/systems analysis
approach; cost-effectiveness; polltloal primacy; antl-
formal ;citjv; ^ cultural atmosphere In the hits
House.
II.
It would be lass -ofesr I the
Kennedy ^glc re were dear after those first
few Tont r even by the end of the year. Secret- ry
Namara frankly admitted to Congress In April that require-
ments at the strategic level were Inadequate, Res
a question as to whether we have an adequate Idea of how much
we need to survive an attack, and, to re* r,
. McNamare. statt
... t, I do not re have an
adequate statement of our retirements at
the present I We are uniert a
development of Just exactly as a
" p«
50
foundation for the fiscal year 19^3
budget proposals.
I do not believe we will
ever be able to develop such a state-
ment of requirements with such prec
slon as to yield a definite answer
which can be presented without quali-
fication.
I say that because there ere parts
of the equation to which we will never
have the final answers.^
Realizing the meaning of Mr. KcNamara^s th , It i* re-
markable how far the administration had progressed In its
strategic thin in? during those first few months.
Professor Loy Henderson, American Unlverslt , reaf-
he vagueness of Kennedy foreign policy concepts
1/1. In his class notes for Probl°ras of , lplomacy (l? A 5)t
. Henderson asserts that In the earlier speeches by Presi-
dent Kennedy the statements with respect to foreign policy
did not fall into "an orderly frnmewor'<."
In summarizing U.S. defense policies in the year 19^1.
r. John Norrls, military affairs reporter for the . as v
ton host wrote:
As the year drew to a close, it was
not yet clear Just where th<» Kennedy
administration was headed, beyond
the clear outline of more secure
^Robert I. KoNaraar* , United States Congres? . :se
of lepreser' Mves, ttee on Appropriations ' v
_
prlatlons for 1 iearinr,? b





but limited strategic retaliatory and
stronger conventional forces already
projected. ->rld events undoubt
would play a large role In shaping
future . . defense pollc/.5
Indeed world events did materially shap 1y defense
policies from the Summer of *6l I
At this point one with ^scor Kr
derson, 'r. Norrls, and others such as Henry Kissinger that
foreign policy objectives In the Kennedy adralnlstif
196l t were not presented In sn orderly May thct may be r
garded as a conceptual framework - which makes f dif-
ficulty In studying the policies!
^.withstanding this lace of cleercut strategic require-
ments, as early as the first Kennedy budget amendment In ^prll
(mentioned above briefly) one can begin to see some of the
basic requirements en ' to the forefro* In his ser I
with Congress, Secretary M cNamara hits at these highlights.
McNamara's statement Included the foil I
a. Pol lnuteman - second generation solid-fuel
programs - are required. These forces can ride out a massive
nuclear attack and be applied with deliberation, alwpyr ^r
the complete control of the constituted authority.
ere we have deterrence, co^r • control r
ments/7
<Tonn Gilbert Uorrls, "United States i,"
cyclopaedia ^rlt-^rlc.r Yearbook , 196? (Chlc«f
•t -arm* *q*r<
9b






b. Llrrlted war forces are to be emphasized. Having
reco.---.nl zed the need for strategic forces, ; r. MoNamare stressed
the Imp e of the united war forces
»
. . . 3ut , having provided for these
essentlel forces (strategic), we want
to see to It that this nation, In co-
operation with Its friends and allies
abroad, has the I of forces needed
to dlscouraga more limited military
adventures by the enemies of freed o-..
&
c. In this same vein, In the testimony KcNamara stated
that our limited war forces should be properly deployed,
properly trained, and properly equipped to deal with "the
entire spectrum" of actions, oy should have both the means
to move quickly to wherever they may be needed on very short
notice, and the ability to respond promptly to limited agres-
sions ,'
These Ideas of course are assumed parts of the require-
ments of selectivity and controlled use of force.
d. cNamara succinctly summed u;. his be sic e
proach In one sentenc "... hat Is belmr proposed at
this time Is not a reversal of our existing national folic ,
but, an lncrense In our nonnuclerr capabilities to provide a
greater derree of versatility to our limited war forces."





._• i • 19.
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Specific recommendations In the amendment for requirements
which supported this basic strategic concept inclu an
Increase In procurement of conventional weapons end equl
ment; Improvement of national readiness of the fleet; modi-
fication of the F-105; development of a new trlservlce tacti-
cal f 1, hter (TFX); Increase In training and readiness exer-
cises; Increase in personnel strengths: Increase In R A D on
nonnuclear weapons and other equipment.
e. In replylnr to whether ' . . "• "! ltary Dosture was
headed for basic change, McNarnara was nonconmlttal . Yet how
he answered this question Is significant . First, he discussed
the nuclear requirements, and then reiterated that there was
a need to strengthen the capacity to engage In wars with con-
ventional weapons;
... We are Increasing the Inventories
and our ability to utilize non-nuclear
weapons, hereby ralslnr the level at
which we would be required to use nuclear
weapons .9
In effect , -he chnnp.e wrs patent — there had been a reassess-
ment of national security requirement n, at
early as April 19^1 » was gradually shlftlr ^pabillty
to launch a full spectrum of respor, , and
varied In nature.
Appendix E shows the full Impact of the «t




amendments, ae well as o'hcr decreases * r \ ee In monies
throughout the admin lstretio . •-? basic ents we:
thus laid on very early by the admlnl.* h perhaps
not In an "ordc , ' cle r r-cut fashlc Furth lcatl
of the^ is to be seer In :>ecret< ry ''cManara's test e-
fore Cor^ ress v. vlr the TM budget amendment,
the testimony was a reemphasls, an! r- " is
statements. *f VllllM W. Kaufmanr, author o c
Strategy t str. tes, "most o'"
third amendment/ v'ere directed toward
nucleor chips. „] 3
I. TWO CRISES IN 1961
he ye^r 19^1 will be remembered for ?t lerst twa key
crises - till ^tey of I Irs brief
admit in handling of t K er^ I es In-
sight Into the development of tho admlnl ' teglc
requlr •- -• '
,
t'
' (l and nonmllltary.
Bay of P1p:8
ere have been multitudinous wrltlns on the events
enoompasslnff the Bay of Pigs Incident. For present oses,
extensive factual ooverage Is unnecessary. This unfortunate
happenlr onal se ley formulate
10 1111 . Kaufmnnn, The HoNaaara Strategy (New




is levably cc , Lllti ..rements
are a vl ' art of the d eel si on-making process.
5 pointed up to President Kennedy many of
the weaknesses In prevlou e-
aents (parti '.y nonmilltary) , '•:• raallsad abr and
pain. atlonal security policy organization
needed tight , t Inexperience was no excuse for this
or subsequent wrong decisions, and that the j would be
hard to reconcll .
Berll
Seve y later through action lcles durl
the Berlin crisis, dTiinlstratlon exhlbltr cable
faclll'v for and control of a crisis. The Immediate,
resolute Presidential r ->n to lusslan noves should be in-
terpreted as manifestation of the flexible re "tegy
which hpd been developing for at leart six months, as we
have se^ .
The President's well-known speech on 25 July to Cc- ^
-
ress truly proclai- ?t of tha requlrer *d in
Chapters II and III. Preslden* .edy stated here that mili-
tary planning was designed to provide:
. . . the c*pr f of plao] any
cr' L area at the app "O] time
a force wH^
, combined with those of
our allies, Is large enough to make
clear our de nation and our ability
M9i
to defend our its at all coc 4::
ar meet all levels of aggressor
pressure with whatever levels of force
are required. Mi intend to have a
wider cnoloe than Fl-
out nuclear action.
H
Having read this, one is reminded of the nonmllltary require-
ment of determlnatlon/wil . (r-SW)
. McNamara reinforced t^eae words in his stntement
before the Congress 26 July. The basic short-term objective
of the measures proposed, he said, is to attain a greater
range of military options together with the related deterrent
and political effects which would go with them!
... he purpose is twofold* to deter
the Soviets from presRln ^rlln
crisis to the point of conflict, cr
to become better able to deal with
any conflict which Right nevertheless
occur. -»-2
self] La weret
ster» un of recruit'' of duty extended: v ;ard
and reservists wer«» mlled to active funds
were a "M <»d to th*> rapid trevent of i and
equipment.
Hjohn F. Kennedy, Public Papers of the Fr nt of
the United Jtotes, >n: vernment I rlntlng
Office, 1962), d. ^3 5.
12 lober' . McNamara, it
epresentatives, littee on . . .- ;
prlatlons :' befo ^7th
Congress] [«t essio trig






of such notions: "... hi .s taker In / u>ust and
September 1961 placed beyond dou • determination of the
United ' i defend Western this »d
Tensol^ to '^he malnt. 5 of pe^ce." •*
In x :>f the Izes
that certainly t tlon'
was 1 1, based upon c o-
mente In p.ev | i. That P,
Kennedy see no recour; hi Pr r ' • Is time
but a detertni , stro* To '"wise
would have re ted establ Lreai xl-
ble response st^- I beer develr ~cem-
ber 1.) ).




YEAR OP CRISIS - 19
r 1962 In retrorp^ «<3 to ^e year of
actual testln... of th' 1 edy l e. Develop-
ment, us well as cor of
tlnued throughout err.
I. GENERAL ADMINISTRATION
I was but an extension of
the pi I - but ai ' *nce
and convlctlo - was th*» snme determinism , the
same push for positive policy, "... va r^d not «nd are not
merely raaotl ^T.^unl latlve."^- e was also
the mati 1 Bar forces must be in-
creased, ac t1 "ated:
After long an! lntensl r , we have
reached the conclusion that, while our
nuclear forces or* itary, -eater
emphasis than in the past must be given,
.th by ourselves r allies,
to our nonnuclear forces.
it we to use nucl^
a, e of '-epre-








s eve -d war situation
If needed.
e policy was clearer thar, In L96l| bat Just as ambiguous.
McNamara reiterated the possibility of uslr .clear
weapons In a limited war situation. Iterated that the
get proposals were not a reversal In erlstl ut
rather, an Increase In the nonnuclear capability In order to
provide a greater degree of versatility to the Ural ar
forces. :*cNamara also stated, In general terms, the require-
ments for adequate, limited war capability:
a. Adequate, combat-ready conventional forces:
b. Airlift and seallft to move these forces promptly
to wherever they may be needed;
c. Tactical air support for the ground forces;
d. Sea forces to Insure control of the seas;
e. lanced and properly proportioned Inventories of
weapons, equipment and combat consumables to Insure that
these forces have what they need to fl^ht i I lvely, I.e.,
lstlc 1 support,'
gardln~ limited war capability, . HcNamsra said
that tl 9^3 budget provided three "quite si nant"
Increase
(1) a 5-dlvlslor Increase to an ll-dlv\ combat
bid. 1 .8. 1 . , . },
19W
force, which is 5 perc auer
.
.
a aubst reaae In
material
;
3) a sujs reuse 1 ^cal
air winga ana the n Ml ai
res8 in was I >servc and .Naaara,
in apeak I the admini8trat , . lite veher.
and reaoluteljf aoout realigning this
,
It
,o a more useful, ready resource. /e
i requirement for flexible, available reaources . r he
executive/policy maker. He emphasized
apect to the Reaerve and National 'juard pro
\t the araou. monf
regardless of the drill pay 8tren«rt
as a
I >n we ah 1
reorganize, or realign as you
•iierve as
Increase the strength of certain of
the units, the so-called priority <
visions that are necessary to r
ment our Active forces in i
our contingency war plana, an








14 Feb 19 , -1 57.
am
0»q«
Th« r Its y »9
or eqi essar >e ref i or elim-
inated.
era was ftrftftnlini *e defenee forces,
ahfn I t) ^m in^ 'ed v
President K» ' nl measr Ke to the ess,
I 2, and tht FJ -3t were lr. I that the
itrfttegy of fli response an jlr^-Tu -hereof pre-
lled. In his messnge t
,
ennedy stressed that
our et jht be tested at many 1 , that at all
times to T Lst nonnuclear or
"as ft oo t to our nuclear c^pficlty, not as a e"
- would be there. "... .' %i
posture which would leave us no choice but inglorious retreat
or unll-ited retaliation."
1 Year 1963 ludget of the United
eminent listed the key elements In our defense program to In-
clude: a strategic offensive force which wouln survive and re-
spond overwhf ly after a massive nuclear att a command
and control system which would survive and direct the response;
an improved anti-bomber defense system; a civil defense program
which woi p to protect an important proportion of our
My, I ubll f»rs of thf jTt of
the unl" ', ton; Cover rrl'
Office^ , n. ] .
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population from the perils of nuclear fallout ; combat ready
limited war forces and the air and seallft needed to move them
quickly to wherever they might have to be displayed; and ipe-
clal forces to help our allies cope with the threat of
Communist-sponsored Insurrection and subversion. 7
II. THE CUBAN MI :ISIS
There was Mr. McNamara's famous counterforce speech at
Ann Arbor, and there were other significant speeches, all of
which fortify the basic strategy as It had developed. 3ut
the event which came to pass In October 19^2 seems to power-
fully surpass all the big words end point toward one direction
- a Kennedy determined policy, with the necessery requirements
at all levels, had become a proven reallt
The POD Annual Heport , though admittedly biased, aptly
sums up the meaning of Cuba:
The Cuban trial! demonstrated the readi-
ness of our armed forces to meet a sudden
emergen^ . It also hi hi l hted th^ 1
portance of maintaining properly balanced
Defense establishment, lncl only
retaliatory forces of overwh^
but also adequately trained and equipped
units In sufficient numbers for lesser
types of action. This military flexibility
udget of the InUed states, FY 19&3 (Was m:






was a major factor In brl abou'
removal of a dangerous thraat to the
8f . .8
One of the I eresting analyses of th<* crisis Is
trj . "'tar's Collision Course, I he Cubar ? Crisis
. lstence . In this book the author besutl fully shows
how the strategy of conflict de facto worked. Pachter's pur-
pose Is to study the Cuban crisis as an "exercise In coexist-
ence; " "to discover some of the rules that govern t-h* "lp"1
matlc sane under the conditions of an atomic . "°
Pachter makes several points i p«#T velld, and
are relevant to national security requirements:
(1) President Kennedy clearly defined and named the
Teat that had arisen, and sp else ac*
cope wit' it . his, says Pachtpr, Is le dershlp based on
scientific thought.*** Is also Implementation of the
strat. f conflict.)
(2) Kennedy did not choose *:he stronrest line of
policy, but the minimum of demonstrative action: shov" a is
opponent the danger but leaving the avenues of retreat open
to hlm. 11
°
DOD Annual jeport for FY 1963 ( Washington i vernment
Printing Office, 196^), i. 7.
^Henry r . Pachter, Collision Coursr, i - • '. e
Crisis pnd Coexistence . 3 Pre A. Praeger,
\ . vli.




(3) The style In which the "vie was won it si
nlflc«nt;. Off oe an<i decisiveness were displayed.
(Here Is the nonmllltary r ont of executive style at
work.
)
^lnts are of the same tenor whl helling
expressed In nil ^trat^gy of Conflict . -'s
aocount , one quiOk] reco t this episode Is truly a
climax *o ^he story of John P. Kennedy ' conceptual views of
national < ty poli^
It with a w looked 11
the forerunner of sterner measures, but It
remained l\^l f id and controlled as an
action; It compelled the enemy to retreat
without drlTJ to despair; it left
him Just so much room for evasion that the
sequel alway .lned at Kennedy's dis-
cretion. It had the beauty of a well-
played herd or of a successful surrical
operation. 12
Whether President Kennedy had read Schelllng's book
or no' ,13 he certainly believed in the "Strategy of onfllct"
- here was bargalnl- , "~ accommodation," winning In the
sense of p;alnlnr; relative to one's own value system and re-
emphasis on the credibility of the potential force. ne
12 i I ., p. 87.
Tias Schell 1 -
, Professor, Harvard Universi* .
a taped interview with the author 10 January 19^ • schell-
in stated that he did not know whether Preslden' nedy had
read Strategy of Conflict
,
but that cert ^nnedy's ad-





lets were afforded »-he or oose
without belnp driven to despair.
Beyond discussion of strategy In retlosl terns, the
Cuban orielI rives us the opportunity to see many of the mili-
tary and non-Mlltary re ^ents. The military requirements
of deterrence, selectivity and controlled us* of fore- were all
put to tha test; the nonnllitnry requirements of positivism,
executive technique end ^.cy of the oolitic*- 1 vert also
vital concepts which helped determine '.'.'.
Cuba, October, 1962.
HI, 1Q6? .SUMMARY 3TATBMK?.
H arttola on Defanta l oll r I n a ] la
yearbook dire tfl *"-he 1 of 19' 2 vls-a-vls
na' ". . . I Ifts in U«8« defense
pollcv, outlined soon after the Kennedy
office J | L, baoame r defined dvrll ) . "*
One l say th°t John F. Kenned
slbly dating back to M Ln policy) I out
the doctrine of fl*l • which levelc
rapidly ln the early months of ' ' . llr-tr^n*'*?
L*Joha oiliMrl rla, •Dnltejd '^nse r oii
noy cloned la rl'-.nnlca Yearbook, 19 f " 3 (Chica. Encyclo-











unot ci during the yer. r, rather they were reiterated with




lr chapter there is emphasis on achieving an ov
view of poller statem^r.
valle rear.
Li of th • »*itef;y-- are referr y and
explicitly thi it these stater
I. THE GENERAL TONE
The .'vtate of th or messere, d 1^ Janur
lf63 1 OOnvty o.h feelln^r c ^s end hope; thf» state
of the ' fact :'OC, . ,, Ftpf' ledy streseed
many fr ointF--t|-w a dor rong
Nation; cotrnon riefer the si 1 '
devel untrlT; th« require p a supr
syf * . • . .
Thr : "... r. Is
is thl I >f th* hill, not the
It ended with a ray
. . . t steer ou \.^h h as
Thomas Jefferson said, • ler. fear
astnr^'. we still wel ">se
winds of chancce—and we have every
our






National security requirements were clearly defined
In the President' 8 budget message for FY 196^ » dated January
17 i 19 r 3» It was as if the MoNamara statements lr were
being repeated. nfj requirements included:
(1) A strong strat. retaliatory force capable of
surviving a surprise attack and responding effectively In a
controlled and flexible manner against the aggressor—addi-
tional ••inutemen and 6 more Polaris;
(2) Improved air and missile defense
(3) more powerful and flexible conventional forces;
(*0 a civil defense fallout shelter pro^rami
(5) strengthened oountar-lm ->* M rces to help
allies deal with Communist subversion.
^wever, these Tonounceraer ts do not convey the
chan r ,( in the conditions of both the domestic °nd Interna-
tional scene in 19 sain elements of the na-
tional security policy regained, the stratery was to be
affected by two Important factors: (a) financial. ^re
Ijohn P, nnedy, he state of the ' nion Message of
the President, delivered Ik Jnnuary 19' 3i
12L1* lchar . "," ad. (fev Yor :
harper I ,~ .11.




was s 4 assure to off or Tense
iget
, ,
there prevailed an even more coirpei admin-
istration ioi . . old outflow. (b frlc-
tlc In there was a running on
arlour aspe^tr o r ^ r .
y before
Congress wag Influent / by th* vs. oe
requlr fere of the
is di asls within those Flex-
ible ree was still t-he dominant principle, yet It was
couch or* in . For
exa- 1
,




thlng In our power to persuade • lies
to mee^ HATO for
ws will possess alternative capabilities
tt«
tacks. And until these capabilities are
achieved, th* 3ef*n:re of
an all-out Soviet attack, even if such
means, would require the use of tao-
.
'













H SPEECHES - A BHIEP A'
Perhaps the beet test of the viability i e-
ments which were developed In 19*1 la analysis of a few of the
major ftdall tlon speeches In 19'
On 10 Jun* -esldent- d- /ed a dyna j«-
roenceinent address at American Unlversl , ashln . .
ils speech, "Toward a Strategy of Peace," a farll-
lar approach prevailed. 1 approach, one of : 1
hope, was ' ove to be the ultimate manll estatlo'
Kennedy's executive style and of his I
conf 1 lot.
In his examination of the . . attitude to* e^ce,
President Kennedy exuded confidence In attainment of su
peace. nethod, he said, was positive action *l z-
he bargaining proces r learly established
aa the method toward peace.
... let us not be blind t
fcrences, 1 llreet Rtt#n«
tlon to our comnon Interests le
me >y which 1 dlf- 1 ^e




the world safe for diversity.^
. . . iorld peace, lice community peace
I
nel^-.hborr; It requires that they
live to o.




subml itas to 9 Just ai
i iT j;ott i wmmi I .3
Was thlr • reasoning f -esolved the Cuban •:
WOt hargalnln cess there oust be -ore than one
or two choices available. We "must avert those confronta-
tions which brln*. an adversary to a choice of either a hu-
mll' -eat or a nuclear war."
) >out esldent Kennedy continued to empha-
size c basic nonmllitary requirements such as seen above
rican University speech (positive leadership; ex
tiv» rtyle) . At +hr same time he trie wrestle with con-
M'h- Vch affe^ -;uch reiulremen* In his Frenkfurt-
i June 19^3t for Instance, he spoke of At-
lar f nershl^ a.n<\ Its meanln
, ad of the need to drive
I closely unified Atlantic deterrent."
eech was confidence and hope, cou led wl ne
d for r^ll^nce upon the strength and unltv It) the /lll-
ance." This policy, of course, was easier spok< ved.'
^oughout his 1963 speeches the President a^nln and
5/Qlan ..evlns, ed., .-) the ;iorv (Chlca
Harper & ow f ] " : Commencr












In reminded the public of the continuing need for deterior-
ation and resolve In our national security policy. He warned
of the temptation to relax our posture. In tr g of peace
we must think concurrently of our capacity to deter aggression
and our ^oal of true disarmament.
ae sl^nln of the Test Ban Treaty In 1963 was sig-
nificant fruition of the Kennedy emphasis upon dlsarmamr
and paths toward pence, an Integrated part of his national
•ecurlty policy. In fact, It should not be overlooked that
disarmament wag Included, fro** Its Inception, In the dy
national security strategy. Hovever, for present purposes
disarmament has not been considered as a basic requirement of
the concept.
In his last speech, undelivered due to the tragedy In
Dallas, President Kennedy had Intended to speak about many of
the same requirements. SpeF Lfl fundamentally of . . stren
and security, he emphasized the need for conviction In our
policy (P*0V), ". . . And when our strenrth and determination
la clerr, our words nred merely to convey conviction, not bel-
ligerence. If we are strong, our 1 -th will speak for lt-
self. If we are weak, words will be of no he
h^ requirement of alliance with others In defending







freedom was once again stated in this final spe<
dependence even beyond the Alliance wag Included as a part of
U.S. strength. Also, the requirement of strength at none was
pointed up here.
One of the most Important administration speeches on
military policy was that delivered by Secretary PoNamara 18
November 1963, Just four days before the assasslnatlc 1th-
in this speech are found many of the basic requirements which
had been part of the original strategy and which had survived
the test of time. Among these were:
(1) Combat readiness and mobility. "... Lt ll
not only force size that matters. te key to the effective




. . . If we were to consider a spectrum
of the possible cases of Communist aggres-
sion and Indirect chal 1 at one end of
the scale to the massive Invasion of iffjl
ern Europe or a full scale nuclear strike
against the West at the other, It is clear
that our nuclear superiority has been and
should continue to be an effective deter-









(3^ ttiTtl The Secretary ateted need for
the rl ht combination of forward ' hly mobile
combet-re. i:
, tea and air unl'-s, ", . . capeDie l
prompt and effective commitment to actual coabat."
(U) And that last requirement--" he Kill to use those
forces agaj ovlet troops and equipment . "12
Thus, In 1963 all v he requirements were Interwoven
throughout the apeeches c nedy, KcN^mara and key admin-
istration figures. '1 he framework was now clear and
11 Ibld, p. 311-312.





Defense Jeoretary BcElroy was axpo - be-
fore Congress the administration's basic national security
pol I ramework. His concept was not removed from that
of Jo" ^nnedy: f'cLlroy spoke of "the number one requlre-
nt" as being prepared for general war; he followed this with
the requirement of being "in a position to aprly whatever
forces are needed in a situation of local conflict -nd apply
them promr>tl .-," so that we may either deter or contain the
enemy. One could construe this latter statement as a policy
of flexl rise, roughly speaking.
In drawing conclusions based on this present study,
one must attempt objectivity. nus, perhaps an appropriate
premise to this closin- chapter Is recognition that whatever
the national security policy requirements conceived by the
Kennedy administration, these were not new requirements.
In fact many of the Kennedy requirements stem directly
1 aymon onnor, ed , Amerlc ense t ollcy In
r rrr. . fictlv, i Ionic ^s to f hr ^~, "An Over-
view of Amer 1 <»nse F ollcy," >u resentatlves
>ort 408, Dep nt of Defense Appropriation
th Cor esslon to ace 7*5* ( N «w Yor
John ns, Ino. 1965), . J-33*«
xot
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from the principles of war which every trained rtllltary man
understands. Listen to Sun Tzu, who was perhaps the first
military strategist (approximately ^th century }.".):
. . . hus the highest form of generalship
Is to baulk the enemy's pla he next
best Is to prevent the Junction of the
enemy's forces; the next In order Is to
attach the I y In the field j end
the worst policy of ell Is to besie
walled cities. 2
. . . he art of war teaches us to rely not
on the ood of the enemy's not com-
ing, but on our readiness to receive him;
not on th \ce of his no* attac '.
but rather on the f^ct that we have made
our position unassailable.
3
It ml 1 ht well be ssserted that President Kennedy was
merely updating some very ancient strategic requirements.
Nany of the maxims of enothrr reat strategist, Napolec
were no doubt read b nedy strategists. For Instance,
the command an^ control reoulrement was pat - a part of
neral Bonaparte's /:
. . . Nothlnr Is mor* nt In war
than unity In common . ore,
u are mk on hostilities against
r single power only, you should have but
one array acting on one line i by
on* oomrr vx
i . till homos S, Fhilllpp, , ad.,
3trate , Collection of military Classics
llltary Service !o., 19^0), p. I .





From Sun Tzu and Napoleon, one spans the years and realizes
i t the : lsenhower strategy, massive retaliation notwlt
standi r , vas not too fsr from that of Kennedy, particularly
the military requirements.
The significant difference In national security polloy
under Kennedy was that the conceptual requirements became a
reality from the logistical standpoint; i.e., the weaponry
and manpower were made ready and mobile. This took an in-
crease in the defense budget as well as a reshuffling of
monies within the various programs of the budget.
Another premise to recognize in drawing conclusions
about the Kennedy strategic concept Is the conditions of the
times. Colonel Robert Glnsburph in his boo , . . 1 1 1 1 - -y
Strategy In the Slxtler
, 19^5* made a very valid, vivid point
when he said, " . . . u.: . strategy hss chanp-ed more In the
last twenty years than it had in the previous one hundred and
sixty five years of our history."-* Colonel :insbur h listed
many new factors which substantiate suc^ a stateme* They
Include (1) air power as the predominant strate -rce:
(2) increased vulnerability of all nations to enemy attac
(3) Increased pace of warfare, and (k) con- itlons tec
nology.6
Scolone *rt N. , . .
tr-.tegy In the Jlxtles (New Yor . . Nor f o.







Thus, with this changed arena rial strategy
ne the changed arenn In requirements.
I . CONC
Reoognl he Inherent restriction*? upon »> new admin-
istration, including past strategy and the condl of the
times, one can then decipher at least two basic co ions
regarding the Kennedy strategy and r eraents there' (1)
The Kennedy strategy developed quite rapidly; and, (2) through-
out Its development the strategy maintained a number of attri-
butes, the most noteworthy b^'. oonslstenoy, dynamlsx
totallt .
e rapidity with which the strategy and attendant re-
quirements were conceived Is quite remarkable. In 'he Mar
nent are points thflt withstood time and war. t,
to be realistic one must conclude that the requirements, t
partially established in the 19^1 budget amendments, wr >t
ly set until June/July That is, all the of
the strategy of flexible r\S9 were ^resent ' 1 early
months, but the corcplpte strategy was not ieced to r and
operating as a whole until the summer, even for the President.
This general conclusion was concurred with by Professor
Thomas Sch - this year. In a personal interview (w> ned
above
)
basic facts about the Kennedy
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strategy, i with ^ It dev- 1,
and, 3ec , the fact that it developed at all: !••« ,
slder the sltj a, *-
tlons of Secretary McNamari; , for example, did not Include
national mill expertise— far from It.
In tracin* the develo* • s (national se-
curity policy) requirements, one senses that there was deep
lofclc behind these requirements, ^on the prese-
study, one i-lso senses t! ere were at least three constr.nt
attributes of the Kennedy strat^.cy/- 'ements. firstly,
there was conslstenc >m the ;' t amendment one
tees the basic requl tl and of course as
the str- tl | ^oame clearer the conslr i was even more
pvldf" .
ly, the strategy was dynamic &nd positive. The
strategy has to fit the W . Kennedy was a doer,
a driver, an action type If you Will, It also fit the
times. President Kennedy felt that the . . had to pull
Itself out of 1 "t and move toward strong
leadc use of peace - "Let us begin." is
major policy st I its are crammed with pc lsa, aa well
as with op i f above and beyond the nnturpl derrree ex-
pressed by great leaders.
l%y was an at
I.e., tr of i >le response and manifestation
•19blB
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thereof. I l *ments were a complete rftcka-e, ea~
pro. rom anot er program, cess
of this attribute wee lar, to the genius of secretary
irnara's management and planr echnlcjues. The major In-
novations were Introduced Into the declslon-rac'rin*- process of
Departs en t of Defense program;'., ng, &r
cost-effectiveness.
Charles J. J ltch, one of v r. MoNamara^
best describes the b«- ? of rarklnf: : m work In
l Leclsl •>> 1 r f "nse :
I I 1 level opment of the p
system, the sr
plannln
-tmdfatlnf/, ™* 8 an enormous phase. . .
ie problem here was to sort out ^11 of the
rlfld pro r activities of the de-
fense establishment and regroup them Into
ts
, 1 . o
.
, 1 ite-
rated combinations of men, - ipmen'
ad lnstnllatlons w^ose effer -»S8 could
be related to our national
lectlves . . .7
ie next tas^, contlnu ^te the
r m elo to the of tl oart-
ment. And there was
Consist
,
dynamism, and to v--are three attrl
butes 111 be remembered of the Kennedy strate lc co
7 Charles J. 1*
( N ey: Univ. of Cai
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it requirements of national security Lor, as de-
termined by the national strategy of i nse under
John I . rtnedy have been delineated, and subr f ex-
plained by rhe historical method. e strat* ^t Its
early stages, and its theoretl. - -en analyzed.
That the requirement* of Ml f% especially
und *cy of *he rolltlcal, o 1 1-
nate from national stratery has become r his anal-
ysis. Thr 1 rements have arms of
the (military] and the ir ltar, .
ie validity of the X f 1oct requirements
was tested several times during the ad- "wo
t critical testa wer lln (1961) end Cube (19< And,
the true validity of the doctrine was never ^ore ar
ate 1 n in those crur.ir>l 6 er 19
Another, more reneral, test of th*» rf T*nts of the
doctrine of fie e was wh<°t- 1* I
fact "turn the tide" of events or ^n the lnt'
lr I b is I it a com-
munist offensive was stop
more, there was a decided shift In ' ^ of the cold
war by the end of the Kennedy ac5 r. Some profess
that a det-nte had come lr til • ' 'oubtedly . re-





directly helped to taring about the beginnings of a
Soviet detente within the International sy r
One necessary last footnote: objectivity has bee:
goel thr this study. Yet It must be frankly adaltted
that strong prejudice In favor of J . HON , the ma
the President, precludes total lstor >ne
will determine whether this men was a great president.
r will never let It be forgot:
-
1
' t let It
at once there was a spot








_1 . Collected Documents
Abshlre, David M. k Richard V. Allen (ed.). National se-
curity (iolltlcal, Kllltary 4- Fconoml «s In the
Decade Ahead). The Center for Strategic Studies. New
York: Frederic . Praerer, 1963.
Chase, Harold W. & Allen I, Lermen (ed.), Kennedy end the
Pre.^s .
ulles, '-"learor Lansing * Robert Plckson Crane ( ed . )
,
Detente, Col 'traterles In Transition . New Yor
->derlo • . Praep-er , 19^ 5.
or, Henry A. ~s of National trate^y . New
York: Frederic . Praeger, 19^5.
Llndley, Ernest <. ( ed
.
) . The -lnds of Freed Of . ,<:ton:
Beacon Press, 19^3*
Lde, James H. & John . . Sales (ed.) Mlltary Posture,
ourteen Issues before Congress , 196^. The Center for
Sti c Studies. Washington: Georgetown University,
19'
Nevlns, Allan (ed.). Thp burden and the ilory (The hopes and
purposes of President Kennedy* f second and third years In
office as revealed In his public statements and addresses.)
New York: Harper A 'low, 19<
"New Frontiers of the Kennedy Admlnlstret Ion," The texts of
the Task Force reports prepared for the President, lie
Affairs Press, 19'
O'Connor, Raymond (ed.). Amerlc -fense toll
tlvr, from Col on 1 -nes to the ir^>":» . New Yc
Wiley Rnd Sons, Tno,, 19










( ed . . an en t a on /mer loan Port!gn
Naw Yot Harper How, l}^.
2. Government Publications
Department of Defense. Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1961
(to the President). WasMrton: eminent Print 1
Office, 196r .
Department of Defense. ;nual gfxort for . lscfcl Year 1,
(to I resident). ^n : government Printing
Office, 1963.
• Annunl Report for 1 lscol Year 19^3 (to the Presi-
dent). Washington: Government Frlntin; Office, 19
MoNamara, Robert S. Remark
New York « Monday, Move
Before the F.conornlc Cluo of
er IB, 19^2.
. :emarks at the Commencement Hrerclse, University
of 'lc4 on , June If, 19*2.
. Statement of Secretary of Uefense Robert
re ' rmed Services Committee, The
r}fcpl i'enr 1 ense Fro» ram and I9A4 Defense
3udr,et. January . , 19^3 -
Public Papers of the President of the United States, 12'
I
,
containing the Public Messages,




Public Papers of *he President of the United States, 19'
contninln the Public Speeches and tatMiantl
of the President. Washington: Government rlntlr
Office, 19*3 •










United States Congress, Senate, Hearings before th
tep of the Committee O' , on • . :
"7
~
t of Defer for 1




. louse of :epresentatlves t Hearings before the
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations (Depart-
ment of Defense Appropriations fo 2), 871 se,
1st Session, Part 3. Washington: /ernm
Office, 1 til.
. Senate, Hearings before the vabcommlttee of the
Committee on Appropriations, 01 eoartnient
of Defense Appropriations for 1 nd
Session. Washington: overnment irlntln; office,
ise of lepresentatlves, Hearings before the
ubcomralttee of the Committee on Appropriation? *rt-
ment of Defense Appropriations for I963) , 87th Conpree,
2nd Session Parts 14 2. Washlr ernment
lng. Office, 1962.
United "tates Congress, Senate, C tee or. Government
Operation?, Adr.l .l.'tr tlon of Natl-; ecurlty, Selected
Papers . Prepared utbcommltt^e on National
t rfli r Derations (Pursuant t . Res. 3?. . th
Cong.). 87th Congress, 2nd Session. Washington: Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1962.
use of epresentatl ves Report k , Jepartmr
of -fense Appropriations nil, I960, 8fth Congress, 1st
Session. o accompany . . 7^5^ ;vervl*w of American
Defense Policy."
2* Pet- interviews
Personal Interview with Mrs. Evelyn Lincoln, the late Presi-
dent Kennedy's personal secret r , 17 v,ay 1
Washington, D.C,
Personal Interview with Professor Thomas Schell ' arvard
University 16 January 19^7 at Armed Forces Staff Col
Norfm , vn . - taped.
B. SECONDAI.
1 . Books





Crown, Janes Tracy and J enty. Kennedy tn rovr
A Critical and Skeptl^ l nnlyals . New Bell ant lne
; '9, Inc.
tchman, Seymour J. I 1-nltci *r\89
Policy. Cenbrld, Press, '*
.
Faber, iMrold (ed.) f The Kennedy Years * Text by The New
Yo lies. New York: The V
ler, [.eler. . he Year of Tr1
clylons . New Yo- Harcourt
,
19'




In the 1 : tlT, . New York: . .,
boh a Charles J. Decision '•p'ln;- To- -
f
] \v:
Univ. of California Presr, 19^5.
Hitch, Charles J. and ! . McKea* . jf
fense In the "uclear Are . Czmbr' -vard er-
slty Presr. , l?.ri.
Kaufmanr, llllerr '. The M ^
Harper ft 3o>, ]
Kennedy, Robert . )f Justice , ; heodore J. Low
(ed.). 'ork: T7
Kl ^r, Henry A. The Troubled Partners 1 . New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1965.
Kraus, l ney. The Debates. ctlve.
ffects . Indiana University Pr^r's, ly'?.
Lerche, ~s 0. The Cold War.... And Aft toglewood




o., T r k.
Manchester, llllaa. Portrait of r. P- 'ton:
Llttl *< Co. , i
Harkas , harles Lam *< Mr r ln. A Sense of Po>»er .








and Coexletence . derlc
, 1 Je
UUpa, Thomas !.., 1 . Gener- ' . .a. Boots of Strategy .
A Collection of Mlltarv Claaalca. Harris burp: The
Military Servl lit' In .
, ] *0.
Powers, Patric ., Lieu' Colonel, U.S. Army. A Guide
atlonol Defense . New York: ederlck A. Prae^er,
1971*"
yraonri, Jac . New Y Harper 4
»
19'
VI ev rron? the 5:even 4
Harper i Bow, 196#.
iellln , rhomag C. 'rnteyy of ^onfllct . Cam et
Hsrv nlversl 1
leslnrer, Arthur tf. Jr. j s
:
It
Settel . . (ed.). The lsdo-n of J New York: E.
Dutton & Co. , 19^5.
ay, h. Jo'.ir Ident . New Yor
Atheneur, 1963.
Taylor, Maxwell ., Genei , ... e UfrQe
nipet . New York: Harper * Brothers, 1959.
2. Periodicals
Amine, O ptaln, .
,
'
-ategy and the New
Frontier," Unit ocee
Vo . , . 3, y.n-r^ , 10'-
,
.
Chan ir ' ure of Power," United
itute r roceei
•
Baldwin, ] Tomorrows," United Statei








lundy, MoO J _
Vo . ctober 1
Depar 1
__1__I_







Lowe, Ceorp-e : . "Bftlaneod Forces or Com orce?,"
' 1 y i roceedlnrfi ,





Fassey, Rober ientenar Br, ...
Hundred Days of thf New Frontier," United
In Proceeding : . Vol. B7, . , 1,
PF • / •
rvey B« , Captain, U. . . "Are We ^eady to Wage
Limited War?,* United States :'av oceedlr
Vol. 9?, Ho. 3, Fare:-, 1 ?6l
,





r and Auti- 1 965«
Unite' I Institute Proceedl
White, Theodore - 3.
Deceirber IV 3, PP. 159-
1' '>icyc1opntedl r Articles
Norrls, Joh
, ed.



















1. U.S. Economic Strength
2. Positive U.S. Action Leadership
3. Political Interdependence
4. Executive Style Technique
5. Primacy of the Political







3. Controlled Use of Force
COMPLEMENTARY POSTULATES
Limited Military Oojectives
Presidential and Nat'l Will/Credibility
Nuclear Superiority
Interdependence of Western Culture
(ACTUAL)
1. Polaris/Minuteman/Missiles
?.. Limited War Forces, including
Airlift, Sealift
3. Research and Development
A. Reserve & Nat'l Guard Forces




















"The hour Is late - but the agenda It lo
First - We must make Invulnerable a nucle r retalia-
tory power seoond to none - by making possible now a stop-
gap air alert and base dispersal progrcn - and by ste
up development and production of the ultimate missiles th
can close the gap and will not be wiped out In a e ie
attack - Polaris, Mlnuteman and lon^-ran^e air-to-ground
missiles - meanwhile Increasing our action of Atlas mis-
siles, hardening our bases and improving our continental
defense and warning systems. As a power which will never
strike first, we require a retaliatory capacity based on
hidden, moving or Invulnerable weapons In such force as to
deter any aggressor from threatening an attaok hi ws
could not destroy enough of our force to prevent his own
destruction . . .
Second - We must regain the ability to Intervene
effectively and swiftly in any limited war anywhere In the
world - augmenting, modernizing and prov Increased mo-
bility and versatility for the conventional forces and
weapons of the Army and Marine Corps. As lonr as those
forces lack the necessary airlift find seallft capacity and
versatility of firepower, we cannot protect our commitments
around the globe - resist nonnuclear agressions - or be
certain of having enouh time to decide on the use c our
nuclear power.
Third - We must rebuild NATO Into a viable and con-
solidated military force, capable of deterrln iny kind of
attaok, unified in weaponry and responsibility. Aim' e-
yond a narrow military alliance united only by mutual fears,
a return to mutual consultation end respect - and a deter-
mined American effort to create a free world economy - can
help overcome schismatic economic rivalries between the
Continent r\nd Britain, and the Common Market and the 'Jut'
Seven, 1 as well as other Western differences i ltary
and political policy . . .




Allan Rrrini (od.), (New York: "TTT^TyT"









Fourth - We must, In collaboration with Western Europe
and Japan, greatly Increase the flow of capital to the under-
developed area e of Asia, Africa, th^ le Kast and Lat
America - frustrating the Communist hopes for chaos In those
nations - ena :>! in emer Li nations to achieve economic as
well as political Independence - and closln the danrerous
gap t 3 now widening between our llv' tandards and
•^lrs. Above all, It Is vital that we aid India to make a
success of her new five-year program . .
.
th - We must reconstruct our relations with the
Latin-American democracies - brln In them Into full Waste
partnership - working through a strengthened Organization of
American States - Increasing the flow of te tl assist-
ance, development caplt , . *.e Invest , exchange
students fnd agricultural surpluses, perhaps thr 'he
large-scale 'Operation Pan-America, 1 which has beer osed
the President of Brazil . . .
th - "« nust formulate, with both Imagination and
restraint, a new approach to the Middle East - not presslr
our case so hard that the Arabs feel their neut^ and
nationalism are threatened, hut aoospti nose forces r
see to help channel them alon cor ' ve lines, while
at the s( me time trying to hasten the Inevitable Arab acce
*»nce of the permanence of Israel . . .
Seventh - We must greatly Increase our efforts to
encourage the newly erne' jn? of the vast continent
of Africa - to persuade them that they do not have to turn
to Moscow for the guidance and friendship they so desperately
need - to help them achieve the economic 'ess on which
the welfare of their people and t! 1 ability to resist Coa-
nlst subversion depend. We can no Ion, or afford policies
which refuse to aooept the Inevitable triumph of nationalism
In Africa . . .
1 hth - We mus' n a Ion e solution to the
problem? ol '^rlln. We must show no uncertainty over our
determination to defend Berlin - *e must realize that
a solution to the problems of that beleaguered city Is only
possible In the context of a solution of the problems of
Germany and, Indeed, ems of all -urope. ve mu
look forward to a free n, In a united Germany In a




nth - We must prepare and hold In readiness more
i and realistic tools for use In Easte rope
. .
We must now be^.ln to work slowly an award pro-
rams desl to wean from t! tert nny de-
pendents sho of dlsconte* i seeds
of liberty In any cracks appearing In ' n by
reducing economic and ldeol^ epend ssla . . .
We must reassess a China policy which has
failed dismally to move toward Its principal objective of
weakenlr rr.unlst rule in the oal.< ch
has failed to prevent a steady growth In Co s t st
and a policy which off*
. solute sjs. of
a militant China . . .
h - We must berln to develop new, workable
ms for peace an-' the control of urns, been
imwlllli to plan for disarmament, le to offer crea-
ve proposals of our own, always leavlm the Initiative In
he hands of the Russians
. . .
Twelfth and finally - sjuftt o • t the strc
er Amerlcr hlch our ultimate ability to defend »ee
world depends. We must Increase our own eoj Lc effort -
not only ny strengthen. nd revair L exlstln research
->grams In all fields, lnclu'ln: the >n of space -
but by build In- an educational system which can produce the
talent and still or ah our future stre progress
depend. We must work to create an America *lth an expand-
ing ee y, where growth Is not dissipated In Inflation,
and consumer luxuries are not confused national strer.
- an economy capable of supporting our massive needs an
new pro? ram ^
. . .
>r all America - Its Preslden Its people - the
iln years will be a time of decision. We must decide
whether we have reached our limit - nether OU -s Is
past - whether we can go no further - or whet ,e
words of Thomas Jolfe, 'the tr irj of \a
before Hi - the true fulfillment of
-mortal








Requirements of a Jefense
«r to meet this threat, the national defense
program must >e lnteK.rated with all other national programs.
Its basic objective oe to maintain sufficient rollltar
strength to deal with both nuclea: eral war and aggress:
under CO ons short of general w» es
and its allies must be able to prevent war if possible, limit
war if It occurs, and defeat nr salon that may threaten
natlonpl Interests. The reauireraenta for such a defense pro-
gram arei
* The maintenance of military technological super-
ior 1 t- ver the Communist oloc.
rent nuclear-delivery systems capable of
effective retPliatlon against the ener .
* A continental defense system, Including both
ct ive and passive measures, si enough to prevent the
enemy iverlng a crlpplln. n the continent'
Unite
* Adequate forces of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps,
and Air torce deployed abroed to meet our International
ons and backed by logistic support adequate for
susta combat.
* Ready forces ot Army, Navy, harlne Corps, and
Air Force capable of intervening r> pldlj in areas where
local a ion may occu . ^se ready forces should have
the capability of emnloyinr nuclear weapons when, and to
the extent, authorized by the President. Logistic support
should be I lately available to r t the deployment.
* Other ready forces of t ,, Navy, Marine
Corps, and Air Force capable of ropi reinforcing over-
seas units under conditions short 01 1 war or in the
event of I *ar. These forces also should have the
capability of employlnr nuclear v s, an 'ions
should be made to sumort than lo in I a
nonnuclear war or a ^ar general war.
Lieutenant Colonel Patric . s, U.
A uldo tlona ense (New York: A.





* Military- and ec -ng capable of
developln In ious str allies
and fr , nd of assist the det' efeat
^8SlO
* Reserve forces In the 1 States capable of rapid
moblll'.vit lo*. to replace ready forces coirr ocal
aggression or to mee needc of o nuclef »1 wt
* Sufficient stockpiles of equipment «d
States and Erleotcd I lrem*»nts of war
until wartime production becomes adequat
* A war-productlo , and trRlnln< base
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